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Abstract This work analyzes the minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network
congestion games with unsplittable flows. The goal is to place tolls on edges, such
that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the tolled game that is a social optimum
in the untolled one. Additionally, we require the number of tolled edges to be the
minimum. This problem has been extensively studied in non-atomic games, however,
to the best of our knowledge, it has not been considered for atomic games before.
By a reduction from the weighted CNF SAT problem, we show both the NP-
hardness of the problem and the W[2]-hardness when parameterizing the problem
with the number of tolled edges. On the positive side, we present a polynomial time
algorithm for networks on series-parallel graphs that turns any given state of the un-
tolled game into a pure Nash equilibrium of the tolled game with the minimum num-
ber of tolled edges.
Keywords Atomic Network Congestion Games · Minimum Tollbooth Problem ·
Series-Parallel Graph · Social Optimum · Unsplittable Flow ·Weighted CNF SAT
1 Introduction
A class of games that are guaranteed to admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium are
congestion games, as introduced by Rosenthal [26]. However, several well-known re-
sults (for example presented by Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [10] or Roughgarden
and Tardos [27]) indicate, that playing a Nash equilibrium rarely leads to a state that
is socially beneficial. Especially in network congestion games, an approach to push
the players towards a social optimum is the levy of tolls on edges of the network. The
goal of these tolls is to turn a social optimum of the untolled game into a pure Nash
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equilibrium of the tolled game. The application of such tolls was shown to be highly
beneficial ([6,12]). If we allow the number of players to be infinite, each routing an
infinitesimal amount of flow through the network, it is well known that tolls fulfilling
the property exist and can be efficiently computed ([5,11,17,25]).
Games with a finite number of players are called atomic. The use of tollbooths
in atomic games has a comparably short history. One of the main differences to the
previous problem is that the strategy change of a single player has a substantial impact
on all other players. Additionally, for the non-atomic games, it can be assumed that
the resulting pure Nash equilibrium is unique, requiring only light restrictions, see,
e.g., Roughgarden and Tardos [27]. As shown by Orda, Rom, and Shimkin, [24] this
is not necessarily the case in atomic games.
Further differentiating the problem leads to the question: Does it suffice that there
is at least one Nash equilibrium that corresponds to a social optimum, or must all
Nash equilibria correspond to a social optimum? Fotakis, Karakostas, and Kolliopou-
los analyzedwhether tolls fulfilling the desired properties exist. They conclude in [18]
that in the latter case the existence cannot be guaranteed even for simple parallel-link
networks. On the other hand, for the former case, they can confirm the existence of
tolls in games where all players share the same source node and give a polynomial
time algorithm calculating the tolls. Other work on this topic is, e.g., Fotakis and
Spirakis [19] or Caragiannis, Kaklamanis, and Kanellopoulos [8]. Another line of
research allows the players to split up their flow ([14,29]). We focus on games with
unsplittable flows; therefore we do not go into detail with this other branch.
Several papers have focused on special cases of the above problem, restricting,
e.g., the height of the tolls ([7]), the set of tollable edges ([20]), or knowledge about
the number of players ([13]). We consider here the minimum tollbooth problem, first
introduced by Hearn and Ramana [22]. In this problem, we additionally try to mini-
mize the number of tolled edges.Work on this topic is mainly restricted to non-atomic
games, with several heuristics as a result (e.g., [1,2,3,21,28]). The NP-hardness of
the non-atomic case with multiple commodities was shown by Bai, Hearn, and Law-
phongpanich in [1] and later for the single commodity case by Basu, Lianeas, and
Nikolova in [4]. On the positive side, Basu, Lianeas, and Nikolova give a polynomial
time algorithm, if the network is a series-parallel graph [4].
Contribution: In this work, we analyze the complexity of the minimum tollbooth
problem for atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows. As mentioned
before, it is already known that such tolls may not exist considering the case in which
every pure Nash equilibrium of the tolled game must correspond to a social optimum
of the original one [18]. Therefore, we focus on the problem in which it is only
required that there exist a pure Nash equilibrium that corresponds to a social optimum
of the untolled game. By a reduction from the weighted CNF SAT problem, we
show that the problem is NP-hard. Furthermore, we also prove that the parameterized
problem considering the number of tollbooths as the parameter isW[2]-hard, giving
evidence that the parameterized problem is not in FPT. An additional spin-off result
originates in the nature of the reduction: Finding a social optimum in atomic network
congestion games with unsplittable flows is hard, supporting and extending existing
results (see, e.g., Chakrabarty, Mehta, and Nagarajan [9] or Meyers and Schulz[23]).
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We also show that for a non-trivial graph class, it is possible to efficiently cal-
culate a solution with the smallest possible number of toll booths. Based on the al-
gorithm by Basu, Lianeas, and Nikolova from [4], we construct a polynomial time
algorithm on games based on series-parallel graphs that turns any given state of the
untolled game into a pure Nash equilibrium of the tolled game with the minimum
number of tolled edges.
2 Preliminaries
This section introduces essential general definitions. In an attempt to shorten some
statements, we will sometimes use the expression [d] for the set {1, ...,d} for any
natural number d throughout the work.
Definition 1 An atomic network congestion game is a tuple
Γ = (G,N,(ce)e∈E ,(si, ti)i∈N)
with G = (V,E) being an undirected graph, N = {1, ...,n} a set of players, ce non-
negative,monotonically increasing cost functions from the set of possible states of the
game to the real numbers, and (si, ti) source-sink pairs with si, ti ∈ V . The strategies
for a player i are the paths from si to ti. The game is called symmetric, if si = s j and
ti = t j for all players i and j. It is called single-source (single-sink) if all players share
the same source (sink). A state S = (S1, ...,Sn) is a vector of strategies of players
(Si is a strategy of player i). The congestion ne(S) on an edge e is the number of
players using that edge in their strategy in state S. The cost of a player in state S is
γi(S) = ∑e∈Si ce(ne(S)), where Si is the strategy of player i in S. The social cost of a
state is the sum of the costs of all players. A social optimum is a state with minimum
social cost. A state S is a pure Nash equilibrium, if for every player i and every state
S′, γi(S)≤ γi((S
′
i,S−i)). Hereby, the state (S
′
i,S−i) denotes player i playing his strategy
from S′ and all other players remaining on their strategy of state S.
Definition 2 The minimum tollbooth problem (MINTB) on atomic network conges-
tion games is the task of finding tolls for the edges of the network such that a social
optimum of the untolled game is a pure Nash equilibrium in the tolled game while
tolling only the minimum necessary number of edges. The tolls are depicted by a
toll vector θ = (te1 , ..., te|E|), with ti ∈ R
+
0 . An edge ei is called tolled if tei > 0, and
untolled otherwise.
We say a state S is implemented in an atomic network congestion game Γ θ if θ
is a toll vector such that Γ θ = (G,N,(cθe )e∈E ,(si, ti)i∈N) with c
θ
e (S) = ce(S)+ te has
S as a pure Nash equilibrium. The state is optimally implemented if for this purpose
the minimum necessary number of edges is tolled.
3 Atomic MINTB is Hard
This section gives the reduction of the weighted CNF SAT problem to the atomic
MINTB problem. We consider formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF).
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Definition 3 A Boolean formula F is inCNF if F =C1∧ ...∧Cn. Hereby,Ci is called
clause and must have the formCi = (ui,1∨ ...∨ui,ki). The ui, j are called literals, with
ui, j ∈ {x1, ...,xn}∪{x1, ...,xn}. The xi are called variables, with xi ∈ {0,1}.
Definition 4 weighted CNF SAT:
Input: A Boolean formula F in CNF
Parameter: A positive integer k
Question: Does F have a satisfying assignment with weight k?
The weight of an assignment is its Hamming weight, i.e., the number of variables
with value 1.
It is well known, that weighted CNF SAT is aW[2]-complete problem, see, e.g.,
chapter 12 of [16] or chapter 13 of [15]. This gives evidence that the problem does
not lie in the class FPT.
Definition 5 Let A be a parameterized problem with parameter k. We say that A is
fixed-parameter tractable (FPT), if there exists an algorithm solving A with running
time in O(p(n) · f (k)). Here, p(n) is a polynomial that depends on the problem size
of A but not on the parameter k, and f (k) is any function that only depends on the
parameter k.
For more information on parameterized problems, we highly recommend [16] by
Downey and Fellows or [15] by Cygan et al.
We will reduce weighted CNF SAT to atomic MINTB in such a way, that the
minimum number of necessary tollbooths is exactly the minimum weight of a sat-
isfying assignment of the formula. We will construct an atomic network congestion
game ΓF based on formula F , where F is in CNF with n variables x1, ...,xn and m
clauses C1, ...,Cm. We will call Λ
0
xi
(Λ1xi) the number of occurrences of variable xi in
F in negative (positive) form, Λxi = Λ
0
xi
+Λ1xi and Λ = ∑
n
i=1Λxi . The game will be
played by a total of m+Λ + n players, each fulfilling a specific role. The m players,
called clause players, will each try to find a strategy that can be identified as satisfy-
ing a different clause. This will be done by each player choosing the occurrence of a
literal in the clause in order to satisfy it. The Λ players, or occurrence players, will
ensure that while satisfying the clauses, a variable cannot be assigned both value 0
and 1. Lastly, the n players are the variable players, that will state which edges have
to be tolled to optimally implement a social optimum. Most players will have both
different sources and different sinks.
For the reduction to be correct, the game ΓF has to fulfill the following properties:
I) Each clause player chooses a strategy that represents the satisfaction of a different
clause.
II) If two clause players choose the same variable as a representative, they both
choose either its positive or its negative form, but not a mixture.
III) Optimally implementing a social optimum requires at least k toll stations, where
k is the weight of the minimum satisfying assignment of F .
IV) From the tolled edges, the minimum satisfying assignment can be reconstructed
in polynomial time.
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We start by constructing a graph for a game that satisfies property I). Only the
clause players play this game.
Let G1(V1,E1) be the undirected graph with
V1 = {s}
∪ {vi,v
0
i ,v
1
i |i ∈ [n]}
∪ {l0xi, j,k,r
0
xi , j,k
,z0xi , j|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ
0
xi
],k ∈ [Λ1xi ]}
∪ {l1xi, j,k,r
1
xi , j,k
,z1xi , j|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ
1
xi
],k ∈ [Λ0xi ]}
∪ {ci|i ∈ [m]},
E1 = {{s,vi},{vi,v
0
i },{vi,v
1
i }|i ∈ [n]}
∪ {{v0i , l
0
xi, j,1
},{l0xi, j,k,r
0
xi , j,k
},{r0xi, j,k, l
0
xi , j,k+1
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ0xi ],
k ∈ [Λ1xi ]}
∪ {{v1i , l
1
xi, j,1
},{l1xi, j,k,r
1
xi , j,k
},{r1xi, j,k, l
1
xi , j,k+1
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ1xi ],
k ∈ [Λ0xi ]}
∪ {{r0
xi, j,Λ1xi
,zxi , j},{zxi, j,ck}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ
0
xi
],
k is the jth smallest index s.t. xi ∈Ck}
∪ {{r1
xi, j,Λ0xi
,zxi , j},{zxi, j,ck}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ
1
xi
],
k is the jth smallest index s.t. xi ∈Ck}.
The cost functions for the edges are a constant 7 for each {vi,v
1
i } edge, a constant
2 for each {vi,v
0
i } edge and a constant 0 for each {s,vi} edge. All other edges have
cost 0 for one, and ∞ (symbolizing a very large number) for any other number of
players. As mentioned before, the game is played by them clause players. Each clause
player i has s as source and ci as sink. Clearly, every node ci is reached by precisely
one player, representing the satisfaction of property I). This is forced by every player
having a different clause as their sink. Property I) could have been satisfied with a
far simpler structure; however, this complex construction is necessary to fulfill the
other properties in the upcoming steps. Also, the reason behind the choice of the cost
functions will shortly become clear.
Figure 1 displays this construction for the simple satisfiable formula F = A∧(A∨
B). For simplification, the names of the l,r and z nodes are shortened.
s
A
A0
A1
B
B0
B1
l r z
l r z
l r z
{A}
{A,B}
0
0
7
0|∞ 0|∞ 0|∞ 0|∞
2 0|∞ 0|∞ 0|∞
0|∞
7 0|∞ 0|∞ 0|∞
0|∞
2
Fig. 1 The game on graph G1 of formula F = A∧ (A∨B) played by two clause players. The red arrows
indicate the social optimum of the game. Variable A is assigned both 0 and 1 in the social optimum.
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From now on, we call a path from a node x1i to z
1
xi
a 1-Path, and from node x0i to
z0xi a 0-path. Similarly, we say a player assigns 1 (0) to variable xi if he chooses the
respective 1-Path (0-Path).
A path from a player from s to an (unsatisfied) clause node c j chooses the positive
or negative occurrence of a variable in C j in order to satisfy the clause. However,
currently, it is possible that two clauses are reached over the same variable, while
once in its negative and once in its positive form, i.e., property II) is not satisfied.
This is the case in the example of Fig. 1. The red lines indicate the social optimum.
The social optimum satisfies clause {A,B} by assigning 0 to A even though 1 was
already assigned to A. We extend our game to fulfill property II). In addition to the
clause players, the game will now be played by the occurrence players as well.
Let G2(V2,E2) be the undirected graph with
V2 = V1
∪ {o0i, j|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ
0
xi
]}
∪ {o1i, j|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ
1
xi
]}
E2 = E1
∪ {{o0xi, j,z
0
xi , j
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ0xi ]}
∪ {{o0xi, j, l
1
xi,1, j
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ0xi ]}
∪ {{o1xi, j,z
1
xi , j
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ1xi ]}
∪ {{o1xi, j, l
0
xi,1, j
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ1xi ]}
∪ {{r0xi, j,k, l
0
xi, j+1,k
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ0xi ],k ∈ [Λ
1
xi
]}
∪ {{r1xi, j,k, l
1
xi, j+1,k
}|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [Λ1xi ],k ∈ [Λ
0
xi
]}
∪ {{r0
xi,Λ0xi ,k
,c j}|i ∈ [n],k ∈ [Λ
1
xi
], j is the kth smallest index s.t. xi ∈C j}
∪ {{r1
xi,Λ1xi ,k
,c j}|i ∈ [n],k ∈ [Λ
0
xi
], j is the kth smallest index s.t. xi ∈C j}.
The costs of edges fromE1 remain unchanged. The new edges {rxi, j,k,cl}, {o
1
xi, j
,z1xi , j},
and {o0xi, j,z
0
xi , j
} have cost 6 for one player and ∞ otherwise. All other edges have cost
0 for one player and ∞ for any other number of players. The cost of 6 ensures that
a clause player cannot use the edge as a shortcut: Without using the new edge, his
maximal cost is 7, and the minimum cost with the edge is at least 8. A total of m+Λ
players play the game on this graph. Each of the Λ players represents the occurrence
of a variable xi in clause C j. If the occurrence is positive, the player has the source
o1xi, j, and o
0
xi, j
if the occurrence is negative. In both cases, the sink is c j.
The graph in Fig. 2 is the result of creating the construction for the formula F =
A∧(A∨B)∧(A∨B∨C), while focusing only on the section concerning variable A. In
an attempt to make the graph clearer, some nodes appear multiple times in the graph;
however they all represent one single node. Nodes with this property are displayed as
rectangles. If they have the same name, they represent the same single node.
The red path indicates a clause player satisfyingC1 by assigning 1 to A. The green
edges encompass three occurrence players, each trying to reach another clause. The
intention of this construction is to fix an assignment to a variable. If not hindered, an
occurrence player will try to reach a clause by going straight to the z node. However,
if there is a player that wants to satisfy the corresponding clause (e.g., by assigning
the value 1 to it), the edge z−C cannot be used by the occurrence player as well.
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s A
A1
A0
o1A,1
o1A,1
o0A,2
o0A,2
o0A,1
o0A,1
l r l r z
l r z
l r z
c1 {A}
c1
c2 {A,B}
c2
c3 {A,B,C}
c3
Fig. 2 The segment of the graph G2 of formula F = A∧ (A∨B)∧ (A∨ B∨C) concerning variable A.
Depicted are the strategies of one clause player (red arrows) and three occurrence players (green arrows)
in the social optimum.
A
A1
A0
7
2
2x A
A1
A0
7
2
2x A
A1
A0
7
2
2x+2
Fig. 3 A demonstration of the effect of the variable player (blue arrow). The clause player (red arrow)
leaves the social optimum (left graph) for the pure Nash equilibrium (center graph). Tolling an edge pre-
vents this defection (right graph).
Instead, he takes the detour via the zigzag path, blocking all 0-paths of this variable,
therefore satisfying property II).
A last problem with the construction is that the desired state reached when all
players follow their intended strategies is a pure Nash equilibrium. Since the state is
a Nash equilibrium already, no tolls are necessary to implement the social optimum,
hence violating property III). A last small change solves this problem. From now on,
the variable players join the game.
Let G3(V2,E3) be the undirected graph with
E3 = E2 ∪ {{v
0
i ,v
1
i }|i ∈ [n]}.
The cost function of all edges from E2 remain the same. The cost function for a
new edge e= {v0i ,v
1
i } is ce(x) = 2x, where x is the number of players that use edge e.
Now all m+Λ +n players take part in the game. A variable player i has v0i as source
and v1i as sink.
Figure 3 illustrates the new component.
The red edges correspond to a clause player, the blue edge to a variable player.
The state on the left is the social optimum.However, it is not a pure Nash equilibrium,
because the clause player can find a cheaper path, reducing his cost by 1 but also
increasing the social cost by 1, displayed in the center state. The state on the right is
a pure Nash equilibrium that coincides with the social optimum of the original graph.
It is the result of tolling edge {A0,A1} with 2.
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To optimally implement the social optimum, placing this toll is necessary if and
only if a clause player satisfies a clause by assigning 1 to a variable, and at most once
per variable. Since assigning 1 to a variable is more expensive than assigning 0, the
least number of variables will be assigned value 1, forcing the placement of the toll
station. Tolling such an edge corresponds to assigning 1 to the respective variable in
the Boolean formula. Therefore, the minimal satisfying assignment for the original
formula can be constructed from the placed toll stations efficiently. Additionally, if
the social optimum can be optimally implemented with at most k tollbooths, then
there exists a satisfying assignment for the original formula with weight at most k.
Graph G3 therefore finally satisfies all four properties. From these reductions follows
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Solving atomic MINTB is NP-hard and W[2]-hard with the number of
required toll booths as the parameter.
To know where to place the tollbooths and therefore the minimal satisfying as-
signment of the original formula, it suffices to know the social optimum. A direct
consequence is that finding a social optimum must be hard.
Corollary 1 Finding a social optimum of a game Γ is NP-hard. Additionally, finding
a social optimum that can be implemented in Γ with at most k tollbooths is W[2]-
hard, with k being the parameter.
4 Optimally Implementing a State in Polynomial Time
This section presents an algorithm that optimally implements a state S in an atomic
network congestion game based on a series-parallel graph in polynomial time. We
base the procedure on a similar approach from Basu, Lianeas, and Nikolova, who
show the same result in [4] for non-atomic games. Starting at the simple base case of
parallel-link networks, we inductively decide on the number of tolled edges for larger
components, based on the optimality of the smaller ones. We do so by exploiting the
recursive structure of series-parallel graphs.
Definition 6 A graph G with source s and sink t is called series-parallel, if
i) it consists of only a single edge.
ii) it is the result of combining two series-parallel graphs in series.
iii) it is the result of combining two series-parallel graphs in parallel.
A combination of graphs G1 and G2 in series means declaring the source of G1
as the new global source, and the sink of G2 as the new global sink. Additionally, the
sink of G1 and the source of G2 are identified as one node in the new graph.
CombiningG1 and G2 in parallel means identifying both sources as one node and
setting it as the new global source, and respectively identifying both sinks as the new
global sink.
A series-parallel parse tree of a series-parallel graph is the representation of the
graph as a tree, where every leaf stands for a single edge, and every inner node rep-
resents either a combination of its two children in series or parallel. For simplicity, in
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this paper, the leaves will represent parallel-link networks, i.e., networks consisting
of two nodes connected by possibly several edges.
Given an atomic network congestion game on a series-parallel network, let T
be the parse tree representation of that network, and S a given state that is to be
implemented in that game. For each node of T , we will create a list of tuples (η ,λ )
with the following meaning. While ensuring that all players follow their strategy in
S, by tolling at most η edges, λ is the highest cost we can force on a new player
entering the network represented by the regarded node. The values for η range from
the minimum necessary to guarantee that all player follow their strategy from S to
the minimum necessary to toll all paths through the network. Additionally, we will
remember a single value λ0, indicating the lowest cost a new player can have, while
ensuring that S is implemented.
Algorithm 1 creates the list for a leaf of the tree, which is a parallel-link network.
For simplicity, we denote by le = ce(ne(S)), and by l
+
e = ce(ne(S)+ 1). Lines 2 and
Algorithm 1: ParallelLink
Data: Graph G= (V,E) represented by leaf v of the parse tree, state S
1 Set listv = [];
2 Set lmax =max{le| e ∈ E};
3 Set ηmin = |{e | e ∈ E and l
+
e < lmax}|;
4 Set ηmax = |E|;
5 Set λ0 =max{max{le},min{l
+
e′
} | e,e′ ∈ E}
6 for η = ηmin to ηmax do
7 Let e1, ...,ek be all edges, and l
+
1 ≤ ... ≤ l
+
k
8 λ = ∞;
9 if η 6= ηmax then
10 λ = l+η+1;
11 Append (η ,λ) to listv ;
3 of Algorithm 1 ensure, that at least the minimum number of edges necessary to im-
plement the given state S in the parallel-link network is tolled. Line 10 calculates the
highest cost enforceable on a new player entering the network. Since the η cheapest
edges are tolled, the highest cost we could force on a newly entering player is the
cost of the η +1 cheapest edge. Only when all edges are tolled, we can guarantee an
arbitrarily high cost, marked by the ∞ symbol. Thus, the tuple (ηmax,∞) forms the
last element of the list.
Since the list is ordered with respect to the values of η , we will address elements
from the list by index, so, e.g., η1 refers to ηmin, and λi is the cost enforceable by ηi
edges. Whenever we refer to the last element of a list, we use max as the index.
Following an inductive argument, we now show how to correctly form these lists
for the inner nodes of the parse tree, assuming that the lists for the children are already
correctly formed. To differentiate between the two children of the inner node r, we
address one of them by v, and the other one by w. Some values will be labeled with
r,v or w accordingly. A tuple for the list of r will originate from two tuples, one for
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each child node. We add two pointers, idxv and idxw, to each new tuple, referencing
their origin.
Series composition: The minimum number of edges that need to be tolled in the
parent node r is simply the sum of the minimum necessary number of edges from
the children, so ηr1 = η
v
1 +η
w
1 . Similarly, the maximum η
r
maxr can be calculated by
ηrmaxr =min{η
v
1+η
w
maxw ,η
v
maxv+η
w
1 }. To complete the list, we have to add a tuple for
every ηri with 1< i<max
r. The corresponding costs are λ ri =max{λ
v
a +λ
w
b | η
r
i =
ηva +η
w
b }, for all i ∈ [max
r]. Accordingly, we set λ r0 = λ
v
0 +λ
w
0 .
Parallel composition: In the parallel composition a player from one component may
be able to reduce his cost by joining the other component. Let cmax be the high-
est cost of a player in both v and w, if all players play according to the state S.
Without loss of generality, let it be a player from v that has this cost cmax. To de-
termine the minimum necessary number of tolled edges, it suffices to check how
many edges in w have to be tolled to force a joining player to have cost at least
cmax. That means, η
r
1 = η
v
1 +min{η
w
i | λ
w
i ≥ cmax, i > 0}, and η
r
maxr = η
v
maxv +
ηwmaxw . Again, we add a tuple for every η
r
i with 1 < i < max
r. The correspond-
ing costs are λ ri = max{min{λ
v
a ,λ
w
b } | η
r
i = η
v
a +η
w
b }, for all i ∈ [max
r]. We set
λ r0 =max{cmax,min{λ
v
0 ,λ
w
0 }}.
Once the lists for all nodes are created, we can choose the tuple in the root node with
the minimum number of edges. We can retrace the creation of the tuple to the leaf
nodes of the tree, where we can decide which edges are to be tolled with which value.
Algorithm 2 is a recursive algorithm that tolls the edges accordingly. For simplicity,
we assume the lists of each node to be globally accessible. The algorithm is initially
called with r being the root node of the parse tree and cin = λ
r
0 , since optimally im-
plementing S requires tolling ηr1 edges.
Lines 1 to 5 toll the edges in the parallel-link networks at the leaves of the parse
tree. Lines 11 to 15 consider the case when r is a series composition. Here the input
cost is feasibly divided into two components. By this division, it is both possible and
necessary to implement Swith the number of edges indicated by the idx pointer. Lines
16 to 18 do the same for the parallel composition. This way, it is always possible to
toll the rest of the network feasibly while only using ηr1. It ensures, that the state
gets properly implemented in all components of the series-parallel graph, and a new
player joining the network has cost at least the initial cin.
Runtime: Let m be the number of edges in the original network. The parse tree can
be created in O(m) time, and also has size O(m). Creating the list at a leaf node is
possible in O(m) time. For an inner node, we have to check at most O(m2) com-
binations of elements from the children’s lists. Therefore, creating the list for every
node is possible in O(m3) time. The computation time on each node in Algorithm 2
is bounded by O(m). The algorithm visits every node of the parse tree exactly once,
leading to a runtime of O(m2). In total, the runtime of the algorithm is O(m3).
Theorem 2 Optimally implementing a state S in an atomic network congestion game
based on a series-parallel graph with m edges is possible in runtime O(m3)
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Algorithm 2: PlaceTolls
Data: Parse Tree T , current node r, cost cin
1 if r is a leaf node then
2 Let (V,E) be the parallel-link network represented by r;
3 for each edge e ∈ E with l+e < cin do
4 set toll te = cin− l
+
e ;
5 return
6 Let v= left child of r;
7 Let w= right child of r;
8 Set i= argmini{λ
r
i ≥ cin | i> 0};
9 Let j be the idxv of tuple (η
r
i ,λ
r
i );
10 Let k be the idxw of tuple (η
r
i ,λ
r
i );
11 if r is a series composition then
12 Set cvout and c
w
out , s.t.:
13 − cvout + c
w
out = cin,
14 − cvout > λ
v
j−1 if j > 1, else c
v
out ≥ λ
v
0 ,
15 − cwout > λ
w
k−1 if k > 1, else c
w
out ≥ λ
w
0 ;
16 else
17 Set cvout =max{cin,λ
v
0 };
18 Set cwout =max{cin,λ
w
0 };
19 Call PlaceTolls(T,v,cvout );
20 Call PlaceTolls(T,w,cwout );
5 Conclusion
This work analyses the complexity of the minimum tollbooth problem in atomic net-
work congestion games with unsplittable flows.
By a reduction from the weighted CNF SAT problem, we show both the NP-
hardness of the problem and, more importantly, theW[2]-hardness of a parameterized
version. The parameter in the latter case is the number of necessary tollbooths to turn
a social optimum of the untolled game into a pure Nash equilibrium of the tolled one.
A restriction to networks that are series-parallel graphs yields a polynomial time
algorithm. The algorithm gives tolls, such that a given state is a pure Nash equilibrium
of the tolled game while using the minimum number of toll booths. This algorithm is
based on a similar method presented by Basu, Lianeas, and Nikolova in [4], who con-
sider non-atomic games, exploiting the recursive structure of series-parallel graphs.
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